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INDONESIA IN 1985 
Chills and Thaws 
Donald E. Weatherbee 
On August 17, 1985, Indonesia celebrated the 40th an- 
niversary of its proclamation of independence from the Dutch. The four 
decades are almost evenly divided by the political discontinuity of gestapo, 
the aborted leftist coup of October 1, 1965, which ushered in President 
Suharto's "New Order" and the politicial dominance of the Indonesian 
Armed Forces. The "New Order's" ambivalence toward its historical ori- 
gins was still apparent in 1985 in the contrasting rehabilitation of the pub- 
lic image of President Sukarno and the execution, after years of 
imprisonment, of four sexagenarian Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) 
leaders. 
From the vantage point of twenty years, let alone forty, Indonesia seems 
to have a lot to celebrate. Compared with the turmoil, negative develop- 
ment, and increasing international isolation marking the late Sukarno 
years, Indonesia today enjoys a reasonable degree of relative political sta- 
bility and economic progess and is emerging as a major regional and 
nonaligned international actor. Nevertheless, President Suharto warned 
his countrymen in his August 17th national day message "to be on guard 
against all kinds of threats, disturbances, and other sources of unrest." 
This is in the context of the generational transfer of power to a younger 
generation from those who first led the nation to freedom in the struggle 
against the Dutch and who later, in their estimation, saved the revolution 
from the PKI. In 1985, the government continued its efforts to consoli- 
date the institutions of the "New Order" to ensure that regime continuity 
would be maintained even as individual role-holders changed. 
Donald E. Weatherbee is the Donald S. Russell Professor in the 
Department of Government and International Studies at the University of South Carolina, 
Columbia. 
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Domestic Politics 
By the time the next general elections take place in 1987, followed by the 
1988 indirect presidential election, the generational transfer will be nearly 
accomplished. One of the major thrusts of President Suharto's current 
term, now at midpoint, has been to entrench the formal structures of a 
Pancasila society. In a country that is statistically 90% Muslim, the Pan- 
casila state is essentially secular, being based on the "Five Principles" of 
the Indonesian state. Ideological or particularistic dissent and division 
over the ends and means of politics is to be contained in the interests of 
development, and political competition is to give way to social harmony. 
This is to be accomplished statutorily through the passage of a package of 
five bills designed to set the "New Order" in constitutional concrete. 
In February 1985, the political parties bill was passed requiring that all 
political parties espouse only the state ideology as their principle. Resisted 
most strongly by Muslim politicians grouped under the umbrella United 
Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP), the new law 
effectively secularizes party competition through stipulating that parties 
can differ only in their programs, not in their principles. The regime con- 
tinues to deny that the adoption of Pancasila as the sole principle for polit- 
ical parties means that the country is moving toward a single-party system. 
Certainly the impact is such that the PPP and Indonesian Democratic 
Party (PDI), the other nongovernmental faction, are no longer vehicles for 
opposition in a competitive party system, but are to serve, as in a single- 
party system, and despite their residual identities, as mobilizers of support 
for government policy. The largest of the PPP's constituent parties, the 
Nahadatul Ulama (NU), has withdrawn from active politics and an- 
nounced that it will be "neutral" in the next elections in so far as the 
voting preferences of its individual members are concerned. 
Already Golkar, the government's non-party party and chief mobilizer 
of electoral support, is gearing up for the 1987 legislative elections. It cur- 
rently holds 246 of the 364 elective seats in the Peoples Representative 
Assembly (DPR). The next parliament will have 500 seats: 400 elected 
and 100 reserved for the military. Golkar aims to win at least 280 of the 
contested seats to maintain its relative position. This means taking about 
67.7% of an estimated 90.68 million votes, or to use Golkar's precise 
figures (two years in advance), 61,391,869 votes. While the PPP and PDI 
have fallen into internal disarray and internecine squabbling, Golkar has 
pushed forward with its ambitious program of organization down to the 
village level. At the end of Golkar's October party congress, party chair- 
man Lt. Gen. Sudharmono reported that membership numbered 10 mil- 
lion, of whom 6.5 million had been given cadre training. The growth and 
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penetration of Golkar raises the interesting question as to whether it could 
provide an alternative or rival to the army as a constituent base for future 
aspiring presidential candidates. 
It was not until June that the controversial Bill on Mass Organizations 
was passed. The other four bills were drawn to keep party politics con- 
fined within the Pancasila. The Bill on Mass Organizations extended the 
Pancasila system to all associational aspects of Indonesian society. All pri- 
vate voluntary social groupings must adopt the Pancasila as their sole 
guiding principle. If any group is deemed to have deviated from the Pan- 
casila, the government has broad powers of intervention and dissolution. 
Muslim opponents of the law saw in it the imposition of a civil religion 
over Islamic organizations. 
It was Islamic opposition to the Bill on Mass Organizations that had 
earlier sparked violent opposition such as the September 1984 Tanjung 
Priok riot. This spilled over into 1985. The country and world were 
shocked in January by bombings of Buddhist images at the Borobudur, 
linked to the commencement of the trials of those arrested in connection 
with the Tanjung Priok riots. Only a week after the Borobudur outrage, 
another national monument, the palace (kraton) of the Susuhunan of Solo, 
was leveled by fire. Sporadic bombings and incendiary attacks occurred 
throughout Indonesia creating a general sense of unease. In early July a 
fire destroyed the Metro shopping center in Jakarta's Chinatown. Two 
weeks later a major blaze gutted the headquarters of Radio Republik Indo- 
nesia. Twenty days after that 60 buildings in a Jakarta commercial district 
were engulfed in flames. The government actively discouraged speculation 
that these fires could have been politically motivated. 
Suharto was resolute, vowing that the government would never bow to 
terrorism and violence. Its reaction to both the verbal and physical assault 
on the Pancasila society has been a crackdown on dissidents of whatever 
persuasion. Three series of trials in particular demonstrated the govern- 
ment's firm intention both to punish and to warn off "subversive" opposi- 
tion. In the wake of the Tanjung Priok riots some 30 defendants were 
jailed for one to three years. Ten people were tried for the Bank Central 
Asia bombings, which were in retaliation for the Tanjung Priok killings 
and which had anti-Chinese overtones. Tasrif Tuasikal, an Islamic teacher 
and alleged "mastermind" of the plot, was given a life sentence. Former 
Minister of Industries Haji Mohamad Sanusi was convicted of conspiring 
in the plot and providing funds. He was sentenced to 19 years imprison- 
ment. Other sentences ranged from 9 to 19 years. Other trials of radical 
Islamic teachers have been held around the country. 
The centerpiece of the legal assault on opposition was the beginning of 
the trials of prominent Islamic and retired military figures for alleged links 
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to the Bank Central Asia bombing conspiracy and subversion. In addition 
to well-known Muslim spokesmen such as Tony Ardie, Marwardi Noor, 
and Abdul Qadir Djaelani, members of the "Petition of 50" group have 
also been called to the dock-first A. M. Fatwa and then, dramatically, Lt. 
Gen. (Ret.) Hartono Dharsono. Some members of the "Petition of 50" 
group, known from their 1980 "Statement of Concern," shortly after the 
Tanjung Priok riots drafted a White Paper censuring excessive use of force 
by the military and calling for an independent investigation of the affair. 
The part of the White Paper that, in the words of the government's indict- 
ment of Dharsono, spreads "the sense of enmity, disorder and unrest 
among the public at large," was the suggestion that the Tanjung Priok 
affair was caused by public discontent over government policy, particularly 
the imposition of the Pancasila as the sole guiding principle. The decision 
to put former Siliwangi Division commander and ASEAN Secretary-Gen- 
eral Dharsono on trial is clearly meant as a chilling deterrent, showing 
that the government brooks no opposition no matter how distinguished the 
quarter. Other "Petition of 50" figures expected to be tried are Ali 
Sadikan, one time governor of Jakarta; Hoegang Iman Santoso, former 
national police chief; Slamat Bratanata, former minister of mines trials; 
and Andi Aziz, former minister of people's industries. 
The uncompromising commitment of the regime to its vision of the Pan- 
casila state can be partially attributed to an inherent antipathy to Muslim 
political demands. It can be further explained in terms of the political 
delicacy of this period of transition in Indonesia and the government's in- 
tention to take no risks as it moves toward the next elections. The govern- 
ment's equation of "extremism of the left" and "extremism of the right" 
was probably partly responsible for 1985's mini-Red scare, which saw pub- 
lic alarm over the alleged infiltration of Indonesia by the clandestine return 
of PKI exiles. 
The Economy 
The year 1985 was another year that saw the macroeconomic management 
of the economy continue to moderate the impact of lower oil prices. Oil 
and gas still account for 70% of Indonesia's export earnings. GDP growth 
in 1984 was 6.5% with inflation kept under 4%. The 1984/85 current 
account deficit was halved to under $2 billion. At the end of April, foreign 
exchange reserves totaled $10.5 billion as compared with the $6.3 billion 
on hand when the rupiah was devalued in March 1983. In June 1985, the 
Intergovernmental Group on Indonesia approved new soft credits and 
grants of $2.4 billion for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1986, the same 
level as the previous year. According to the World Bank, Indonesia has 
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been "very prudent" in its overall management of its international debt 
which at the end of 1984 was estimated at $24.6 billion. The debate on 
industrialization strategy in Indonesia continued in 1985, fueled by the 
World Bank's call for "an early rationalization of industrial and trade pol- 
icy" by eliminating "implicit subsidies" to inefficient and high-cost domes- 
tic industries. These industries are often, however, the best-connected 
politically. 
Too much of a good thing continues to flood Bulog, the National Logis- 
tics Bureau, with a huge surplus of rice. Only five years ago Indonesia was 
still a rice deficit country, but it now has had three bumper years in a row. 
The 1984 harvest was 25.5 million tons with Bulog stockpiling 2.7 million 
tons. The 1985 harvest is estimated at 26.3 million tons with Bulog stocks 
rising to 3.5 million tons. Another million or more tons are privately 
stored. Indonesia stared exporting rice in 1984 with 100,000 tons going to 
the Philippines and 169,000 tons to Africa. Because the internal pricing 
mechanism puts the cost of Bulog's stock well above world rice prices, 
exports would in fact have to be subsidized. 
In an effort to sharpen the competitiveness of Indonesia's non-oil ex- 
ports, an aggressive campaign was launched in 1985 to reform Indonesian 
ports. Presidential Instruction (Inpres) 4 swept away in April the notori- 
ously corrupt and inefficient Indonesian Customs Service and turned the 
task of clearance over to the Swiss Societe General de Surveillance. Bu- 
reaucratic and administrative reforms are expected to cut harbor costs by 
half. That the government is resolved to achieve the goals of Inpres 4 
seems indicated by the fact that Armed Forces Commander General 
Benny Murdani was placed in charge of the cleanup. Within two months 
dramatic changes were evident, with administrative hurdles at Tanjung 
Priok, Indonesia's main port, being reduced from 52 to 3, and goods time 
on and off the docks cut from 15 days to 2. Inpres 4 shows again that 
when convinced of a sense of economic urgency, Indonesia's leaders can 
act decisively in the face of vested bureaucratic and political interests. In- 
pres 4 is cut from the same pragmatic cloth as the bold austerity measures 
of 1983. 
Foreign Policy 
The year 1985 was the 30th anniversary of the Bandung Afro-Asian Con- 
ference, which signalled Indonesia's emergence on the world stage. To 
mark the occasion, and to announce in a sense its own reemergence on the 
world stage, Indonesia hosted in April a commemorative gathering of 80 
nations to reaffirm the relevance of the Bandung Principles. Although 
short on real substance, given the requirements of fashioning a document 
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acceptable to all, the conference projected Indonesia as a major leader in 
the nonaligned movement, providing Jakarta with an extra-ASEAN plat- 
form to assert its new self-confidence and claim to proper international 
standing. To some extent this was at ASEAN's expense, since Indonesia 
gave way to India on the issues of Cambodia and Afghanistan. The Indo- 
nesian-drafted declaration referred indirectly to "conflicts in Southeast 
Asia and Southwest Asia." 
In October 1985, at the Rome Food and Agriculture Organization meet- 
ing, President Suharto was the spokesman of the "South" to Franqois Mit- 
terand's "North." Suharto also undertook an East European tour, which 
was also seen as validating Indonesia's nonaligned credentials. Quiet lob- 
bying tried to present Indonesia as an alternative compromise candidate to 
lead the nonaligned movement for the 1986-89 period. No compromise 
was necessary, however, since the September 1985 Luanda Nonaligned 
Foreign Minister's Meeting selected Zimbabwe as the venue for the 1987 
summit. 
One aspect of Indonesia's nonaligned diplomacy has been its continuing 
efforts to persuade the more politically radical African states to accept the 
irreversibility of Indonesia's sovereignty in East Timor. Although the is- 
sue of Timor has faded after ten years, it still refuses to go away. At the 
Luanda meeting, host country Angola controlled the agenda and despite 
strong Indonesian objections included the question of East Timor in its 
draft of the political resolutions. After bitter debate, the reference to East 
Timor was dropped. The question of East Timor was also, for the third 
year in a row, excluded from the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly. 
Even more satisfying for Indonesia was Australian Prime Minister 
Hawke's recognition of Indonesia's de facto sovereignty in East Timor and 
the closing down of Fretilin's radio link to Australia. 
Relations also improved with Papua New Guinea as the PNG govern- 
ment began a more active policy designed to discourage and obstruct OPM 
insurgents among the thousands of Irian Jaya refugees from using PNG as 
a sanctuary for attacks on the Indonesian side of the border. Port 
Moresby's new approach also led to the forced repatriation of 12 Irian 
Jayans after they served prison terms in PNG for firearms offenses. The 
deportations sparked an Irian Jayanese riot in the border town of Vanimo 
near the Blackwater refugee camp. It was at this camp a year earlier that 
an Indonesian official mission had been attacked by OPM supporters. 
It is in relations with the PRC that perhaps the greatest alteration in 
Indonesian foreign relations occurred in 1985. Indonesia's diplomatic re- 
lations with the PRC were suspended in the aftermath of gestapo in which 
Indonesian leadership suspected a Chinese hand. Despite sporadic civil- 
ian-based calls for normalization of relations with China, Indonesia con- 
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tinues to insist on an explicit disavowal of support by Beijing for 
communist movements and parties in Southeast Asia. There is a broader 
strategic background in which Indonesian security managers view the 
PRC as a long-range threat. 
There had been some speculation that the attendance of Chinese For- 
eign Minister Wu Xueqian at the Bandung session-Indonesia's first offi- 
cial Chinese visitor in 18 years-might presage some political 
breakthrough. An anticipated private meeting between Wu and Suharto 
did not take place, either because of poor scheduling or as a diplomatic 
snub. The talks between Wu and Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar 
did result in the finalization of plans to resume direct Indonesian-Chinese 
trade, cut off since 1967. By 1984 indirect trade, mainly through Hong 
Kong and Singapore middlemen, had reached the modest level of $242.9 
million a year. In July 1985 a nongovernmental agreement was signed in 
Singapore between the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(KADIN) and the China Council for the Promotion of International 
Trade (CCPIT) providing for direct trade between the two countries. This 
was followed by an exchange of KADIN and CCPIT trade missions to 
explore areas of mutual advantage. The Indonesian delegation returned at 
the end of July with what it claimed were commitments by the Chinese to 
purchase more than $200 million of Indonesian goods, which would re- 
dress the deficit Indonesia had been running in indirect trade. Indonesian 
officials went out of their way to deny that the resumption of direct trade 
relations with the PRC was the first step toward normalization of diplo- 
matic relations. 
It is probably correct, in fact, to put the change in PRC trade policy in a 
commercial as opposed to political setting. It fits fully within Jakarta's 
aggressive efforts to broaden its non-oil exports and also to open nontradi- 
tional markets. The new direct trade ties to the PRC balance the effort 
made in 1984 to obtain greater economic access to the Soviet Union and 
East Europe. The Soviet opening was followed in October 1985 by the 
official visit to Indonesia of USSR Deputy Prime Minister Ryabov, the 
highest-level Soviet visit since 1965. In part Indonesia's "ostpolitik" re- 
flects increased concern in Jakarta, as elsewhere in ASEAN, with what is 
perceived as creeping to galloping protectionism in the Japanese and West- 
ern industrial countries. High on Indonesia's bilateral agenda with the 
United States, for example, was its vigorous opposition to the terms of the 
Jenkins bill, which, as originally drafted, would have severely impacted on 
Indonesia's textile exports. 
Indonesia continued in 1985 to pursue its "dual track" diplomacy to- 
ward Vietnam, one track being its own bilateral relationship with Hanoi, 
the other its adherence to ASEAN's policies on Cambodia. The "dual 
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track" diplomacy is itself dual-tracked in the sense of an official Indone- 
sian policy toward Vietnam as represented through the Foreign Ministry 
and a military policy toward Vietnam as pursued by General Benny 
Murdani. While perhaps complementary in the Indonesian-Vietnamese 
track, the military link does complicate Indonesia's relations with Thai- 
land, ASEAN's front-line state. 
Foreign Minister Mochtar traveled to Hanoi in March 1985 and his 
Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Co Thach paid a reciprocal visit to 
Jakarta in August. The August visit in particular was invested with great 
significance by Vietnam. If followed the 11th Indochinese Foreign Minis- 
ters' Meeting at which Vietnam announced its intention to withdraw its 
forces totally from Cambodia by 1990. Giving greater weight to Indone- 
sia's role as ASEAN "interlocutor" than perhaps is warranted, Vietnam 
tried to place the August Mochtar-Thach meeting in the framework of a 
Vietnam-ASEAN negotiation. This is viewed from Bangkok and Beijing 
as an effort to drive a wedge between Indonesia and Thailand since the 
flexibility of the bilateral agenda allows positions previously rejected by 
ASEAN to resurface as Indonesian proposals. For example, in the August 
meeting Mochtar raised as a point the establishment of a demilitarized 
neutral zone on the Thai-Cambodia border, which when suggested by the 
Indochinese side three years earlier had been rejected by ASEAN as an 
effort to reduce the dispute to a Thai-Cambodia border question rather 
than a Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Symbolically, at least, Foreign 
Minister Thach appeared pleased at the outcome, noting that "the pro- 
gress was very encouraging." A month later at the U.N. General Assem- 
bly, Vietnam's Vo Dong Giang, with reference to the Indonesian dialogue, 
claimed that conditions for a political settlement of the Cambodian prob- 
lem were "steadily ripening." The presumption seems to be that there will 
be a follow-up. In October 1985, an Indonesian trade delegation visited 
Vietnam. Later the same month a delegation from Indonesia's National 
Defense Institute paid an official visit. In November, senior editors from 
the Indonesian Journalists' Associaiton followed the path to Hanoi. 
Contributing to the atmosphere of the Indonesian-Vietnamese relation- 
ship was the April 1985 visit to Indonesia by Vietnamese Defense Minister 
General Van Tien Dung, reciprocating General Murdani's visit to Viet- 
nam a year previously. Again in his public comments Murdani stirred 
ASEAN. He accepted that the announced Vietnamese troop withdrawals 
from Cambodia were genuine, not merely disguised troop rotations, as 
ASEAN holds. This was particularly galling to Bangkok since it came in 
the wake of the most punishing Vietnamese dry-season offensive ever. Re- 
iterating his view that Vietnam does not represent a threat to Southeast 
Asia, Murdani hailed Dung's visit as opening up "fine long-term prospects 
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for the advancement of multi-faceted relations between our two countries 
and armed forces." The Indonesian armed forces relationship is not lim- 
ited institutionally to Vietnam's armed forces. While in Indonesia, 
Nguyen Co Thach made a publicly unscheduled flying vist to Murdani in 
Bali. 
As part of his Vietnam diplomacy, Foreign Minister Mochtar also inter- 
vened between the United States and Vietnam on the issue of the MIAs. 
Coming out of his March 1985 visit to Hanoi, Mochtar proposed that the 
U.S. and Vietnam should take steps toward normalization of relations. 
This, in his opinion, would facilitate an environment in which the 
Cambodian crisis could be resolved. The first step in the process, as sug- 
gested by Mochtar, would be the establishment of a U.S. interest section in 
Hanoi and a speedy resolution of the MIA question. This would be syn- 
chronized with a phased withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambo- 
dia. Whether at Indonesian instigation or not, certainly late 1985 saw a 
much more forthcoming Vietnamese position on the MIA question. It is 
Indonesia's belief that U.S.-Vietnamese normalization must be part of a 
comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia that leads Jakarta to con- 
tinue to view negatively the prospect of U.S. military assistance to the 
Khmer resistance, even though for the sake of solidarity it joined the Feb- 
ruary 1985 ASEAN appeal. 
Indonesia's higher-profile foreign policy and its meanderings from the 
ASEAN straight and narrow on Cambodia have caused questions to be 
raised as to the depth of Indonesia's commitment to ASEAN. Has Indo- 
nesia "outgrown" ASEAN as it seeks a leadership role consonant with its 
relative power and new-found political confidence? In Michael Leifer's 
words: "There is a growing willingness in Jakarta to think aloud about the 
unthinkable because ASEAN is seen to be holding Indonesia back."1 But 
because some elements of the Jakarta foreign policy elite are worriedly 
frustrated over Cambodia does not mean that they would lightly abandon 
the structure of regional cooperation that has served them so well in so 
many ways. The real problem is the degree to which ASEAN will be per- 
ceived in Jakarta as being strategically penetrated by extra-regional inter- 
est in competition with the working out of Indonesian national interest in 
the ASEAN setting. 
1. Michael Leifer, "Indonesia in ASEAN-Fed up being led by the nose," Far Eastern 
Economic Review, October 3, 1985, p. 26. 
